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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LEE GRAY, the Natural 
Father of David Allen Gray, 
aka John Gray, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BEEHIVE LODGE OF ELKS, #407, ; 
I.B.P.O.E.W.; CHARLES H. 
TAMPLIN; JAMES E. DOOLEY; 
NATHAN WRIGHT; JAMES P. COLE-
MAN; ANDERSON PEARSON; ROBERT 
HANDY; and ISAIAH HAWKINS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of 
David Allen Gray, aka John Gray, a twenty (20) year old minor son of 
Robert Lee Gray, plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges the respondents 
were negligent in not providing adequate security to protect the de-
cedent against dangers which respondents should reasonably have fore-
seen and anticipated would exist during a New Year's Eve Celebration 
on December 31, 1973, and January 1, 1974, at the premises of the 
Beehive Lodge of Elks, #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., located at 248 West South 
Case 
No. 
14355 
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pie Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, The defendant Beehive Lodge of 
s is being sued under its common name pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the 
h Rules of Civil Procedure and the individual defendants are offi-
s and trustees of the said unincorporated association. The ori-
ial action also involved a defendant Galveston Sonny Scott whom 
s plaintiff alleges fired the fatal shot which killed David Allen 
Ly the minor decedent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor sitting 
th a jury of eight (8) members on October 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 
3 31, 1975. [R. 74-80]. The jury returned its verdict finding in 
vor of the Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., and against 
e plaintiff, "no cause of action." The jury also found in favor 
the plaintiff and against the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott and 
sessed damages as follows: Special Damages: $1,100.00; General 
mages: $15,000.00; Punitive Damages: $15,000.00; for a total of 
1,100.00. [R. 212-213]. Thereafter, on November 28, 1975, the 
aintiff filed its Notice of Appeal appealing from that certain 
udgment on Verdict" which awarded the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
ainst the defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W. [R. 227-
:9]. The plaintiff did not appeal from that separate "Judgment on 
jrdict" which awarded judgment to the plaintiff and against the de-
indant Galveston Sonny Scott in the amount of $31,100.00. No cross 
>peals were filed. 
-2-
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,, RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to reverse the judgment appealed from and 
to have this Honorable Supreme Court order a new trial for the plain-
tiff on all issues involving the defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, 
I.B.P.O.E.W. and the individual officers and trustees of the said 
l o d g e . . • • • . ' • • • ! , - • . i * : • . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is the natural father of one David Allen Gray, 
aka John Gray, deceased. [R. 640]. * David Allen Gray was born 
on February 9, 1953, and died from a gunshot wound sometime about 
2:00 a.m. on January 1, 1974, during a New Year's Eve Celebration held 
on the premises of the Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., at 
248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. [Ex. 13 - P ] . At the 
said time and place, the premises at 248 West South Temple were leased 
and operated by the Beehive Lodge of Elks. [R. 489-491] . This par-
ticular New Year's Eve Celebration was open to any members of the 
public who could pay the five dollar ($5.00) cover charge; and no ~ 
one was turned away for any reasons other than the premises were full 
to capacity. [R. 505, 507-508]. At the time of the shooting, the 
decedent was a business invitee upon the premises and had a member-
ship card to the said lodge on his person at the time of his death. 
[R. 726-727]. The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott and assessed damages of 
$31,100.00 against Scott. [R. 953] . This verdict implies a find-
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that Scott shot and killed David Allen Gray as will be developed 
more detail and for which finding there was ample evidence. 
The defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407f I.B.P.O.E.W., is an 
.ncorporated association in the State of Utah and was registered 
:h the Salt Lake City License Department. [R. 494. Ex. 22-P]. 
i individual defendants Charles H. Tamplin, James E. Dooley, Na-
=tn Wright, James P. Coleman, Anderson Pearson, Robery Handy, and 
aiah Hawkins; were all officers of the lodge or members of the 
ard of Trustees, the said unincorporated association's governing 
dy and were all acting in the scope of their employment during 
e conception, the planning, and organizing and the participating 
the December 31, 1973, and January 1, 1974, New Year's Eve Cele-
ation. [R. 494-495, 552. Ex. 22-P]. The New Year's Eve Celebra-
on is an annual affair and has been held every year since 1962 at 
8 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. [R. 31. Answer to 
,terrogatory No. 15]. 
Ex. 1-P is a schematic drawing prepared by the Salt Lake City 
tgineer's Office showing the layout of the premises where the 
tooting took place and Exhibits 2-P to 11-P are photographs taken 
the Salt Lake City Police Department about one hour after the shoot-
i g . - - ,-• - • - . -
During the said New Year's Eve Celebration and for a year 
:ior thereto, James E. Dooley, was the Exalted Ruler of the unincor-
>rated association. [R. 442] . This is the highest elected official 
: the local Beehive Lodge of Elks. [R. 442]. Mr. Dooley admitted 
-4-
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there had been five or six fracases each year at the Beehive Lodge 
of Elks. [R. 481] . He further testified that sometime less than 
three (3) months prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration there was 
a fracas that had taken place between two (2) people who were 
gambling in the basement of the Beehive Lodge of Elks. This fracas 
resulted in one person going out to his car, getting his gun, and 
coming back and shooting the other person in the leg. [R. 482-486]. 
Neither Mr. Dooley nor anyone else at the lodge stopped the card 
player from going out, getting his gun, and coming back into the 
lodge, going downstairs, and shooting the other card player. [R. 496 
** 497] . • One of the defendants own witnesses testified she had heard 
abput this shooting and it was well known among the members. [R. 84! 
849, 891]. Mr. Dooley stated the Board of Trustees barred the person* 
involved from the premises. [R. 486]. He said other people had 
been barred from the premises for conduct unbecoming or bad conduct 
or rowdiness or for other broad reasons. [R. 486-487] . 
-
 ;
 After the gambling shoot out, Mr. Dooley asked Anderson Pear-
son to get some special training and instructions downtown on how 
to perform his duties as a security guard and how to police the area 
during the time of the New Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 409-410]. 
Mr. Pearson testified'this request was made approximately one (1) 
month before the said celebration. [R. 409-410]. Mr., Pearson ad-
mitted he had never received any instruction as to what to do in 
the event there were guns and shootings and/or knifings present. 
[R. 408] . He admitted he failed to follow the request of Mr. Dooley 
and never did get the special instruction. [R. 410-412]. Mr. Pear-
son was a member of the lodge's Board of Trustees [Ex. 22-P, R. 405-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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7]; and was also a member of the lodge's internal security division 
own as the Antlered Guard - one of whose purposes was to provide 
curity for a function such as the New Year's Eve Celebration. 
.."32-33/ 389/ 407-411/ 466. Answer to Interrogatories Nos. 18, 
/ 20/ 21/ and 22]. During the New Year's Eve Celebration, Mr. 
arson testified he was given the specific duty to police the area, 
eak-up arguments, break-up fights, and to bring peace to the fes-
.vities. [R. 408-409]. He stated that to the best of his know-
>dge, he was the only one on the premises to keep order. [R. 408]. 
The New Year's Eve Celebration took place on Monday and Tues-
ly, December 31/ 19 73, and January 1, 1974. Less than forty-eight 
18) hours prior to the celebration, and in early morning hours of 
jnday, December 30, 19 73, there was another fight and shoot out 
i and about the premises. [R. 736-746]. This shoot out involved 
le defendant Galveston Sonny Scott, David Allen Gray and Blood or 
Dungblood - the same three persons who were involved in the New '< 
ear's Eve shooting. [R. 736-746]. The fighting occurred during 
regular Saturday night dance which Mr. Dolley testified was in 
11 respects about the same atmosphere, number in attendance, etc., 
s the New Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 492-494]. The fight appa-
ently started over some verbal exchanges involving the participants 
espective girlfriends. [R. 561-563]. After the fight, David Allen 
ray and Blood went outside to get some firearms and some of the 
efendant Galveston Sonny Scott's friends found him a weapon. [R. 
63-564, 579-580]. Scott then went outside and within a few minutes 
;here was a typical "Dodge City-type shoot out" behind the parked 
:ars, etc., with rifles, and revolvers furnishing the sound effects. 
P- 564. 481-4831 . 
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This shooting took place about 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 
30, 1973. The lodge's manager, Exie Gray, broke up the fight inside 
the premises and asked Galvston Sonny Scott and David Allen Gray 
to take their fighting outside. [R. 396-398, 402}. Exie Gray said 
he heard about the shooting a few minutes later, but never did take 
the time to find out what was going on or who did the shooting. 
[R. 399-401]. One of the witnesses who attended this Saturday night 
dance, said the shooting outside occurred "no more than two minuteP" 
after the fight broke up inside; and she heard the shooting while 
she was still inside. [R. 786-787]. The Saturday night dance was 
terminated early because of this fight between Scott and Gray. [R, 
364-366]. The bandleader said after he stopped playing, several 
people came running in from outside and said there had been some 
shooting. [R. 368]. 
One William Middelton was present at this early Sunday morning 
shoot out. He was called as a witness by the defendant Galveston 
Sonny Scott. [R. 731]. On cross-examination, he stated the fight 
between Scott and Gray occurred about 1:00 a.m. Sunday, December 
30, 1973. [R. 736]. He said when Scott went outside after the 
fight, he had 357 magnum revolver in his hand. [R. 738]. Mr. Mid^ 
dleton testified he got in his car and drove around to the front 
of the lodge where he saw Scott, Gray and many other people on the 
street with guns. [R. 738-744]. He further testified these same 
people with guns had been inside the lodge attending the dance a 
few minutes earlier. [R. 769]. 
Exie Gray was the lodge's acting manager for both the Saturday 
night dance and the New Year's Eve Celebration and was present at 
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:>oth events. [R. 32, 283, 383, 488, 504-505]. Although he personally 
Droke up the Saturday night fight between Scott and Gray; and al-
though the dance was closed early because of the fracas, he failed 
and neglected to take any steps to prevent a recurrence of this 
fighting and shooting at the New Year's Eve Celebration; even though 
someone ran into the lodge to tell him about the shooting a few minutes 
after it occurred. [R. 399-401]. He further testified he did not 
appear before the lodge's officers or Board of Trustees to discuss 
security measures for the New Year's Eve activities, nor was he ever 
asked to do so. [R. 40 3]. 
Nathaniel Johnson was the lodge's chairman of the New Year's 
Eve activities. [R. 488]. He testified if he had known about the 
Saturday night fight he would have 
"Given specific instructions to the people on 
the door, as well as myself. I probably would, 
and I am giving you what I probably would have 
done. Based on my thinking here now, I would 
probably would have approached Sonny and told 
him not to come to the club that night. And 
? then I would also have told him if I tell you 
don't come and you do come, I am going to get 
a Court Order and take — have the police take c 
you from the premises. That's what I would do. 
That's what I would do now if anybody causes a i -
disturbance." [R. 915]. 
Unfortunately, Exie Gray was not so thorough. Had he been, the New 
Year's Eve shooting may never have occurred. 
Mr. Dooley testified there were no special security personnel 
hired on this occasion. [R. 501]. He further testified he had the 
authority under the club's constitution to 'Appoint a policing unit, 
be it a hired policing unit or whatever, at his discretion as he saw 
fit," [R. 504]; however, he felt the lodge's volunteer Anderson 
Pearson would be sufficient with extra security training. [R. 501-
502]. Exie Gray testified he had reported the Saturday night fight Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to Jim Dooley. [R. 4 00]. Anderson Pearson also testified Exie 
Gray had told him about the Saturday night fight. [R. 424]. How-
ever, neither Dooley nor Pearson did anything to prevent a recurrenc 
of the fight or to investigate the shooting activities. Nathaniel 
Johnson testified most of the lodge's members knew Scott [R. 535] 
and it would have been a simple matter for him to have passed the 
word to watch for Scott, especially if Gray also happened to be on 
the premises. 
The minor decedent, David Allen Gray, also known as John Gray, 
arrived at the Beehive Lodge of Elks premises sometime shortly after 
midnight on Tuesday, January 1, 1974. [R. 372-373]. He had a mem-
bership card on his person at the time of his death. [R. 726-727. 
Ex. 25-D, page 1]. The officers of the Beehive Lodge of Elks admitt 
David Allen Gray had a right to be on the premises and they knew of 
no reason why he should have been turned away. [R. 516, 917]. 
Earlier on New Year's Eve, Mr. Gray had been the receipient 
of some target practice cum malcum intendi by the defendant Galvesto] 
Sonny Scott who fired at Gray several times with Scott's 35 7 magnum 
revolver while Gray was on the sidewalk. [R. 566]. Later Scott firec 
several shots into Gray's home. [R. 566]. Scott told his girlfrienc 
the same day he killed Gray, that he had been out trying to kill 
Gray that morning and the previous night. [R. 322]. 
When Gray got to the Beehive Lodge of Elks, he immediately 
went over to the table of one of his friends and asked if she had 
seen Scott. [R. 372-374]. When the answer was that Scott had not 
been there that night, Gray appeared relieved and stayed there for 
the rest of the evening until he was fatally shot. 
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The defendant Scott finally found Gray at the New Year's Eve 
Lebration at approximately 2:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 1, 1974. 
a detective from the Salt Lake City Police Department who got there 
thin five (5) minutes after the shooting testified there were about 
ree hundred (300) persons still on or about the premises. [R. 256]. 
viously, the celebration was far from over. :The lodge was serving 
early morning buffet-type breakfast, the band was still playing, 
d people were still dancing. [R. 339-340]. The lights were .on, 
d the festivities were still very much alive. [R. 339-340]. 
When Scott arrived by car, he put his 357 magnum in his belt 
d went in to join the party. Only one man was stationed at the 
*ont entry way at the time. [R. 926]. The other man had left 
>out Ll:30 p.m. and gone upstairs. [R. 926, 929-930]. The man 
; the door did not stop Scott to check for his membership card nor 
) ask for the five dollar ($5.00) cover charge. This doorman, a 
ripple, said he "was going to have the fellows go in there and get 
Lin [Scott] and bring him back out." [R. 926] . He never did this 
)wever. 
As soon as Scott went into the main room, he was grabbed by 
*veral people who knew him and wrestled to the floor. They let 
Lm go when they saw his gun. [R. 569-570]. About this same time, 
le bandleader announced over the public loudspeaking system there 
a.s a disturbance and asked the participants to take the fight 
utside. [R. 282]. Although everyone heard this announcement, 
either Anderson Pearson, James E. Dooley, Exie Gray, or any of 
rie other officers of the lodge came up to see what the fighting 
as all about, or to do anything to insure that it was in fact stopped 
nd taken outside. It was after several minutes this fight and announcement before Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the shooting started [R. 281-385]; and the plaintiff alleges this 
was ample time for the management to have detected the presence of 
Scott and to have disarmed him. 
Just before the shooting started, Scott spotted Gray at the 
rear of the lodge near the back bar. Gray was talking to a lady 
friend, Brenda Bradley. [R. 311]. Apparently one Binky Coleman 
joined Scott as he entered the lodge; because after the shooting 
started, the witnesses described both Scott and Coleman as doing the 
firing together, moving together toward the rear of the premises, * 
and backing out together. [R. 460-462] . When Scott saw Gray and 
Blood at the back bar, he turned some tables over and got ready to 
commence shooting. [R. 420, 447]. Mr. Dooley testified when Scott 
walked by him, Scott was only three feet (31) away. [R. 445]. He 
said Scott had a gun in his hand, but Dooley did nothing to disarm 
Scott, nor to ask him to leave, nor to stop him from shooting. 
[R. 445]. He simply watched Scott pick up a chair, put!.it on a tabl 
and start shooting. [R. 447]. ? ^ 
At about this same time, the security man Anderson Pearson was 
in the basement eating a sandwich. He heard the tables being over-
turned and went upstairs to see what was happening. [R. 418]. He 
saw Scott standing by the juke boxes and identified his position with 
an "X" on Exhibit 1-P. [R. 418-419]. He had not heard any shoot-
ing at this time and was only two feet (21) away from Scott when 
he first saw him. [R. 419] . He observed Scott had a gun in his 
hand which at that time was being held down at his side. [R. 419-42( 
He said he watched Scott raise his gun, say, "I am going to get that 
son-of-a-bitch," and shoot toward the fear of the building where Gra] 
-11-
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d Blood were. [R. 423]. When the shooting started, Anderson Pear-
n was afraid he might get hurt; so he went back downstairs and 
ayed there until the police came downstairs and retrived him about 
e-half (1/2) hour later. [R. 419-420]. Mr. Pearson admitted he 
.d not have a badge and uniform on the night of the celebration nor 
.d anyone else who was present. [R. 430]. He further admitted he 
_d not have a night stick or any equipment on his person to use to 
:rike anybody and make it felt or to otherwise incapacitate them. 
X. 437-438]. Another member of the Antler Guard, Sylvester Jones, 
is also present during the celebration. He was not on official 
ity, but was there only as a member. He testified he would have 
arried a night stick onto the premises had he been there on official 
uty as one of the Antler Guards. [R. 4 74]. Pearson admitted he 
id not try to identify himself to Mr. Scott, to tackle ,Scott, to 
ncapacitate him in any way, or to do any other thing that would 
top him from shooting; even though he was only two feet (21) from 
im at the time. [R, 436-437]. 
The lodge had anticipated some problems might occur during the 
lelebration, and had worked out a system to turn the lights on and 
•ff if a disturbance occurred. [R. 517]. However, the system 
:ailed miserably, and the lights were off during the shooting rather 
;han on; and on and off throughout this period of time with no 
ipparent order. [R. 314, 39 3, 444]. During this time, Scott and 
:oleman were repeatedly shooting toward the back bar and shots were 
:>eing returned from this area by the man named Blood. [R. 340-
350, 460-463] . 
After David Allen Gray and another man Phillip Dawson were 
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killed, Scott and Coleman continued to shoot as they backed 
out of the premises. [R. 460-462]. After they left, general 
chaos broke lose as the patrons scattered to the doors. The 
bandleader who was only a few feet from the front door ob- -
served many of the patrons going out of the front door and 
testified several of them had guns in their belts. [R. 350]. 
He identified eight (8) of the people whom he personally knew 
who had guns and said there were several others whom he did 
not know. [R. 350]. 
When the shooting started, the minor decedent, David 
Allen Gray, tried to assist his friend Blood to get under 
the pinball machine. [R. 388-389]. He then pushed Brenda 
Bradley to the floor and fell upon her, saving her life. 
[R. 315]. She said during the approximate one-half (1/2) hour 
she had been talking to Gray prior to the shooting, she 
didn't observe him with a gun, nor did she see him with a gun 
after the shooting started. [R. 315]. Several of the other 
patrons who had seen and talked to David Allen Gray also 
testified he did not have a gun on his person the night ua^ 
he was killed. [R. 280-281, 289, 292, 319, 338, 376, 526]. 
And the officer who searched the person of David Allen Gray 
after his death testified he didn't find any weapon of any kind 
on the decedent. [R. 726]. * - ! J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION WAS IN EFFECT A 
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE BEEHIVE LODGE OF ELKS #40 7 
AND ITS OFFICERS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
Instruction No. 36 reads as follows: "You are instructed 
that a private lodge or association, as well as its officers, has 
no duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime will be committed 
by another person, and to act upon that belief." [R. 198]. This 
instruction was adopted verbatim by the court from the defendant's 
proposed Instruction No. 26. [R. 141]. The plaintiff objected 
to the giving of this instruction because (1) the jury should 
have been given the sole discretion to determine whether under the 
circumstances of this case, it was reasonable or not reasonable 
for the lodge to anticipate and foresee that crimes, to-wit: shoot-
ings and/or assaults and batteries would occur during the New Year's 
Eve Celebration because of the past history of such events, [R. 
952]; and (2) the court did not define what a crime was. 
The plaintiff submits the court's Instruction No. 36 is in 
effect a directed verdict in favor of Beehive Lodge of Elks and 
its officers and against the plaintiff. Purrant v. Pelton, 16 
U.2d 7, 394 P.2d 879 (1964). The instruction amounted to both a 
finding of fact and a review of the evidence by the trial judge; 
whereas the jury has the exclusive prerogative to make such findings 
of fact and to weigh the evidence. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Con-
struction Company, 29 U.2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973) 
The plaintiff submits the evidence would justify the follow-
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ing findings of fact by the jury: 
1. There were several fracases or fights on the premises 
of the Beehive Lodge of Elks each year. [R. 48] . 
2. Less than three (3) months prior to the New Year's Eve 
Celebration there was a shoot out during a gambling argument and 
fight; that during this time one of the participants went out-
side, got his gun, came back in, went downstairs in the basement 
where the gambling game was being held and shot the other parti-
cipant in the leg. All of this was done in the presence of James 
E. Dooley, the most exalted ruler of the lodge. [R. 482-486]. 
3. The gambling shooting was well known to members of the 
lodge. [R. 848-849, 891]. 
4. Shortly after this gambling shooting incident and less 
than a month prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration, James Dooley 
asked Anderson Pearson, a member of the Antler Guard - the lodge's 
internal security division - to go uptown to get more training in 
security so that he would be able to better perform his duties 
during the New Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 409-410]. 
5. Anderson Pearson had had no training in how to deal with 
shootings or knifings and this is the reason Mr. Dooley sent him 
to get the special training. Both Mr. Dooley and Mi;. Pearson agree 
that the special training would be necessary to prevent shootings 
chr knifings. [R. 411] . 
6. Less than forty-eight (4 8) hours prior to the New Year's 
Eve Celebration there was a fight inside the Beehive Lodge of Elks 
premises involving Galveston Sonny Scott, David Allen Gray, and 
Blood or Youngblood - the same three (3) persons involved in the 
New Year's Eve shooting. This fight was broken up by Exie Gray 
who was the acting manager of the New Year's Eve Celebration and 
also the Saturday night dance. [R. 736-746] . 
7. When Galveston Sonny Scott left the premises after the 
Saturday night fight he had a 35 7 magnum in his hand which every-
one saw. [R- 738]. 
8. When Scott went outside he was confronted with rifle 
shots from Gray and Blood and returned the fire for several min-
utes. [R. 564, 381-583] . 
9. Several persons inside the premises heard the shooting 
outside within two (2) mintues after Scott left. [R. 786-787]. 
10. Within a very few minutes after the shooting, several 
people ran inside to tell Exie Gray that the shooting had occurred. 
[R. 368, 399-401]. 
_1 R-
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11. After the Saturday night shoot out many of the members 
who left the dance had guns in their belts and these guns were ob-
served out on the street in front of the lodge. [R. 744]. 
12. The Saturday night dance stopped early because of this 
fi^ht. [R. 364-366]. 
13. Exie Gray told Jim Dooley and Anderson Pearson about 
the fight. [R. 400, 424]. 
14. Both the Saturday night fight and the shooting and the 
New Year's Eve shooting involved the same participants, to-wit: 
Galveston Sonny Scott, David Allen Gray, and a man by the name of 
Blood or Youngblood. [R. 340-350, 460-463; 563-564, 579-583]. 
15. Nathaniel Johnson, the chairman of tne New Year's Eve 
Celebration, said if he had known about the fight he would have 
banned both Gray and Scott from the premises. [R. 915]. 
16. A fight is a crime, to-wit: assault and/or battery. 
17. A shooting without justification is a crime, to-wit: 
murder, manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, attempted mur-
der, etc. a 
18. James Dooley, Shelly Smith, the bandleader, and other 
members of the lodge knew that David Allen Gray and Scott were on 
the premises during both the Saturday night fight and the New 
Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 280, 311, 337-338, 526]. 
19. Members of the New Year's Eve committee knew that Gal-
veston Sonny Scott was on the premises during the New Year's Eve 
Celebration. [R. 926-930]. 
20. David Allen Gray had been seen on the premises by James 
Dooley and other members during the New Year's Eve Celebration be-
fore Scott came in. [R. 280, 311, 337-338, 372-373, 526]. 
21. Galveston Sonny Scott was known by most of the members 
of the Beehive Lodge of Elks. [R. 444, 534-535]. 
22. James Dooley testified the black community is so small 
in Salt Lake City that everyone generally knows everyone else. 
[R. 498]. 
23. David Allen Gray, the minor decedent, had a membership 
card on his person at the time of the shooting during the New 
Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 726-727. Ex. 25-D,page 1]. 
The plaintiff submits the foregoing facts which are without 
dispute in the evidence, raise the issue of whether the Beehive 
_1 £-
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Lodge of Elks and its officers and agents connected with the New 
Year's Eve Celebration did in fact have a duty to anticipate that 
Galveston Sonny Scott and David Allen Gray and Youngblood would 
be on the premises during the New Year's Eve Celebration and/or 
whether because of a history of prior fights and/or shootings 
on and about the premises, similar incidents could be expected 
during the New Year's Eve Celebration. 
The general rule of law is that the duty to use care to 
avoid injury to another many be based on imputed or constructive 
knowledge - that is, what a prudent person under the circumstances 
should have known - since the opportunity for knowledge, when 
available by the exercise of reasonable care, is the equivalent 
of knowledge itself. The law of negligence, insofar as perception 
is concerned, requires a person to give to his surroundings the 
attention that a reasonably prudent person would consider neces-
sary under the circumstances, and he must use his senses to dis-
cover what is readily apparent. One under duty to use care for 
which knowledge is necessary cannot escape liability for negligence 
because of voluntary ignorance. 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence 406-
407, §56 "Imputed Knowledge." 
The courts have uniformly held that the duty of care includes 
the duty to anticipate danger that is reasonably foreseeable. 
Every person is under duty to exercise his sense of intelligence 
in his actions in order to avoid injury to others, and where a 
situation suggests investigation and inspection in order that 
its dangers may fully appear, the duty to make such investigation 
and inspection is imposed by law. If the circumstances are such 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lat a person of ordinary common sense who thought about it would 
icognize once that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in 
Ls own conduct in regard to those circumstances, his acts would 
Lace another person in danger, the duty to use ordinary care and 
cill to avoid such danger rises. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 407 
57 "Duty to Foresee Danger." 
If Exie Gray had made even a cursory investigation of events 
arrounding the shooting at the Saturday night dance, he would have 
asily determined that Gray, Scott and Blood were involved in the 
hooting; or if he could not ascertain their names, would have been 
ble to determine the shooting occurred by some of the same parti-
ipants who were on the club premises a few minutes earlier. In 
aking precautionary steps to guard against a recurrence of these 
vents during the New Year's Eve Celebration, Exie Gray did not 
eed to anticipate the precise injury which was sustained. In this 
egard the general rule of law is that it is not a necessary ele-
tent of negligence that one charged therewith should have been 
ble to anticipate the precise injuries sustained. Nor is it 
Lecessary that the injury to the plaintiff himself be foreseeable; 
.t is sufficient that the act in question may in human probability 
>roduct harm to persons similarly situated. For anyone liable for 
legligence, it is sufficient that he should have foreseen that 
tegligence would probably result in injury to some person of some 
:ind, but he need not have foreseen the particular consequences or 
.njuries that resulted. In any case, it is the tendency of the 
ict involved to cause some injury to the person who is actually 
mjured thereby, or to someone else who occupies a position which, 
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in reference to the -uc, is titt^I&^Qus to t h e situiticSW o f iJjc in-
jured person, under :-Ivr circinuHl inces known to the a c t o r , tha* i s 
to be discovered. It AM, JUT; *<;i ^egl igenee, pp. 411-41.2 §SS 
"Anticipation of Sor« ^ ti^ra Is :V?i:i ,tcient. " : 
••.V' The New Year's-* >;:-«'*> ^ e k n ! ; ,>n was such an event o r social 
function that would • t-* . *wt .aVi iS, •• members of the black coimnnity, 
and i t seems clear t . , •; • :• -
 ;>ho knew about the Saturday night 
fight and shooting s. u havr« : :". . .n fur ther steps to ensure tha t 
Scott and Gray and BU,o-i ^ouli >^ fc be together on the premises; 
a t the same time dux?:.-? :.:o N»»-. •'••ir's Eve Celebration. . 
r Nathaniel C. 0 ,. , '.,, tK, ,;in :;man of the New Year 's Eve 
Celebration, t e s t i f i '.-•* .. i" he !;.•>/• i-uown about the fight between 
Scott and Gray on th _ . - .fo s^ .,( , g the Saturday night dance, he 
would have banned bo'h e?u: fr^ia i-iy-: premies. [R. 915]. This 
shows he would have ' * * ' a^ . j < w ;her t rouble and the jury could 
easi ly have found un .\?y ':h-3 <. ».* .. ,.[.. cances, t h i s i s what James.-
Dooley, Exie Gray, a.;i/' .- VcT* - Pearson should have done a f te r 
the Saturday night fi *;i! ! . '> anticipate tha t perhaps anof-hOT 
fight and/or shooting - i^  i b. .:. > ><.tted by the same pa r t i e s arid 
to take sufficient a< I , o ; ' t did not happen by ta lk ing 
to the par t ies invoT l !c , .• i , them to stay away from the club 
premises. Unfortunately, ,if*itlv r v! rie Gray, James Dooley or 
Anderson Pearson were -::s ..'nc. '< • < . bout the fighting and shoottljg 
as Nathaniel Johnson said Ue ^ould have been. , -
The case of Tnc'i ' ' 1 I'•.-. ;. usinesr-inen' s Club, Inc . v. jBjgis, 
479 3.W.2d 84.2 (1972) : ' . ry • :h n point. This was a su i t lby an 
invitee against a pr i 'at,:: <"lub uio ethers for compensatory and. 
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* i • ' 
and punitive damages because of injuries attributable to a gunshot 
wound. The" plaintiff was wounded while he was on the premises of 
a nonprofit corporation known as Industrial Businessmen's Club. 
He arrived shortly after midnight and stayed there until approxi-
mately 6:30 a.m. Beer and other intoxicating beverages were served 
on the premises and there was no evidence that anyone was turned 
away from the club. Several other people on the premises had guns 
and were gambling. 
Insofar as the duty of a private club to anticipate that 
crimes will be committed on the premises is concerned, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, commencing on pp. 848 of the S.W.2d reports steted 
in part as follows: 
"We have^said that no distinction exists between 
hotels^ and glacis of public amusement ;jU> the )• .i,:u 
" matter of precaution to be taken for persons 
. .invited tQ ,ejijoy facilities f urnishe-d- > +\ -v We 
'*
 :
 recognize that neither are insurers of the safety 
sr, , t ? Q £ ,theiy-guests, but that both are charged with 
the duty of taking all precautions for the pro-
. . tectiofl of^ tfreir guests which reasonable pru-
dence and ordinary care would suggest ". . . the 
,tweight of^authority supports the view that while ri 
a tavern keeper or bar operator is not "an ih-
. purer ofa.the. .safety of his patrons, he is under -
~"t:he duty to use reasonable care and vigilence 
.to protect guests or patrons from reasonably
 5 
*foreseeable injury, mistreatment, or annoyance 
. — •
 a
^< the frauds of other patrons. . . ,.,.  ,^
 r 
_^
 r"N,egligence in such a situation may consist, of , . ;-»-^,-,-f-. 
~"failure to take appropriate action to eject * ""J••"'"/'"" 
.s-;\m persons of undesirable character fjpm the pre- H - ;, 
mises or knowingly permitting irresponsible, 
/ vicious or drunken persons to be on, or about, the ,,5; v\ 
^premises, or failure to maintain order and " *'*' 
sobriety in the establishment. Of course, the 
proprieter is not required to protect patrons 
of a bar or tavern from unlikely dangers of ^
 or 
improbable harm, but he is required to take' 
affirmative action to maintain order when h^rm — 
_9A^. 
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to patrons is reasonably foreseeable, and 
certainly whenever the circumstances are such 
as to indicate that the danger of harm to 
patrons by other patrons should have been anti-
cipated by one reasonably alert . . . in this 
respect, the court's instruction as to the 
liability of Buck in the club was correct," 
[Emphasis Added]. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the court's Instruction No. 
36 should have been replaced by an instruction similar to the gener 
principles of law set forth in the Industrial Park Businessmen's 
Club, Inc. case. The court should have instructed the jury the 
Beehive Lodge L in _ 
"was under the duty to use reasonable care and 
vigilence to protect guests or patrons from 
reasonably foreseeable injury, mistreatment 
or annoyance including crimes, at the hand of 
other patrons; and where harm to patrons is 
reasonably foreseeable and certainly where the 
circumstances are such as to indicate that the 
danger of harm to patrons by other patrons should 
have been anticipated by one reasonably alert." 
Such an instruction was requested by the plaintiff, but refused by 
the court. [Plaintiff's Requested Instruction NO. 26 (R. 111)]. 
Insofar as the defendants argument that they had no duty to 
anticipate crimes would be committed because no such incidenis had 
occurred previously, see the case of Samson v. Saginaw Profes-
sional Building, Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975). 
In discussing the issue of "no prior incidents of a similar 
nature on the premises," the Michigan Supreme Court stated on pp. 
849 of the N.W. 29 Reports, as follows: 
"The fact that no prior events had taken place 
in the Saginaw Professional Building and that 
the director had not been involved in incidents 
of this nature in nine (9) years, plus the fact 
that the State of Michigan had released these 
patients into the community all go to the quest-
ion of whether or not an unreasonable risk of 
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harm was present under the circumstances. No 
prior incidents would possibly indicate a very 
low probability of an event occurring in the 
future. A low probability, however, must be 
balanced against the magnitude of the potential 
harm involved to determine whether or not 
inaction under these circumstances is reasonable. 
Also, reasonableness, as foreseeability, £¥ 
normally a question for the jury to determine. 
General tort principles require this approach. 
If the risk involves possible death or serious 
bodily injury to a number of persons, the law 
requires that some care be exercised, even 
though the probability is slight that the"inci-
dent will occur. Whether the care exercised 
is reasonable under the circumstances is for 
the jury to determine. 
"The existence of a relationship between the 
defendant and its tenants and invitees placed 
a duty upon the landlord to protect them 
from unreasonable risk of physical harm. The 
fact that such an event might occur in the future 
was foreseeable with this defendant. It had 
even been brought to its attention by other 
tenants in the building. The magnitude of 
the risk, that a criminally insane person 
running amok within an office building filled 
with tenants and invitees, was substantial to 
say the least. To hold that, possessed of these 
facts and no other, this defendant should have 
inquired further into the reasonableness of 
its inaction, i.e. the probability of such an 
event occurring in the future, and that its 
failure to make such an inquiry may be deemed 
neglgience on its part, does not shock the 
conscience of this courtT" [Emphasis Added]. 
Similarly in the instant case when the management of the 
Beehive Lodge of Elks knew about the prior fighting between Scott 
and Gray and they knew, or should have known, that the shooting 
on the outside of the premises involved Blood, Gray, and Scott 
and when there was a history of fights at the lodge and at least 
one prior shooting during a gambling fight, there was a duty both 
to investigate that shooting and to take adequate precautions to 
prevent such fightings and/or shootings occurring in the future 
-22-
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especially when all of the black community were likely to attend 
the New Year's Eve Celebration. In Samson, the court concluded 
its opinion by holding that the jury should determine the ultimate 
questions quich may impose liability, those of foreseeability, 
reasonableness, and proximate cause. In the instant case, however, 
the trial judge did not allow the jury to determine these issues. 
In the case of Durrant v. Pelton, 16 U.2d 7, 394 P.2d 879 
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial judge committed 
prejudicial error and in effect directed a verdict when he gave 
an instruction that a driver had the duty to keep her vehicle 
always under control so as to avoid an accident. This court said 
in part on p. 8 of the U.2d Reports, as follows: 
"For our purposes it is sufficient to say that 
even considering the testimony in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, who was the 
prevailing party below, the trial court erred 
in not 'permitting the jury to determine, in 
the light of existing conditions, what a rea-
sonable and prudent person would do under the 
circumstances.'" [Emphasis Added]. 
The court further stated in part on p. 10 of the U.2d Reports as 
follows: 
"However, the test 'as to what constitutes a 
particular lookout is usually *** - a latter-
day classic question for jury determination, 
and each trial and appellate court may deter-
mine the question as a matter of law only when 
convinced that reasonable persons could not 
disagree upon the question in conscientiously 
applying fact to law.' . . . A jury should 
determine what a reasonable and prudent person 
would do under the conditions as they existed 
at the time of the accident." [Emphasis Added]. 
Similarly in the instant case, the plaintiff submits the trial judge 
should have allowed the jury to determine whether under all of the 
circumstances the Beehive Lodge of Elks should have anticipated 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that "crimes" such as fights, shootings, knifings, etc., would 
have been committed on the premises during the New Year's Eve 
Celebration. 
The plaintiff submits the duty of the Beehive Lodge of Elks 
and its officers insofar as business invitees and other patrons 
on the premises is concerned, is analogous to a landlord's duties 
to its tenants insofar as protecting the tenants from criminal 
activities of third persons. An exhaustive discussion of this 
matter is set forth in 42 A.L.R.3rd 311 (1970), "Landlord's 
Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third 
Persons." The cases collected in this annotation hold that a land-
lord is under an affirmative duty to protect his tenants and 
invitees from a foreseeable unreasonable risk of criminal attack 
from third persons. See particularly the cases of Johnston v. Harris, 
387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Kline v. 1500 Massachussetts 
Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir. 1970); and Kendall 
v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C.Cir. 1956). In the Kendall 
case, the court underscored the analogy between the liability of 
a landlord for exposing his tenants to physical defects in the pre-
mises and his liability for exposing his tenants to an unreasonable 
risk of criminal attack. 
To the same effect see 2 Harper & James Torts (1956) §16.9 
p. 931, wherein the author states: ^ 
"The amount of caution required tendd. to increase 
with the seriousness of the injury if it happens. 
If the harm which may be foreseen is great, con-
duct which threatens it may be negligent even 
though the statistical probability of its happen-
ing is very slight indeed." [Emphasis Added]. 
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Similarly a ten percent (10%) risk of death, murderous assault, 
blindness or other great bodily harm may be condemned by the jury 
as an unreasonable risk, especially where the burden of adequate 
precautions is relatively slight as it is in the instant case where 
five (5) security guards could have been hired for a six (6) hour 
sift at a cost of only Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy Cents 
($83.70) [R. 627-628] and where chemical mace capable of render-
ing Scott, Gray and Blood unconscious for thirty (30) minutes could 
have been obtained for a cost of only Seven Dollars and Ninety-
Five Cents ($7.95). [R. 618]. 
The plaintiff submits this prior history of fights, shootingsi 
etc., distinguish the instant case from all those other cases cited 
by defendants where the private clubs and its officers had abso-
lutely no prior notice of any kind of any trouble between the 
offending participants or had no knowledge of any circumstances 
that would give rise to a duty on their part or on the part of the 
club to anticipate problems between the participants. 
Instruction No. 36 was urged on the court by defendant's 
counsel on the basis of the Utah case of Strong v. Granite Furni-
ture Co., 77 U. 292, 294 P. 303 (1930). [R. 698-700]. The Strong 
case involved a claim for damages for household furniture and 
other items which were stolen from plaintiff's home. The plaintiff 
had purchased some household goods from defendants. When the 
plaintiff became delinquent in paying for the goods, the defendants 
entered plaintiff's home during her absence and removed their 
merchandise. Sometime thereafter, other unknown persons broke into 
plaintiff's home and stole other items of personal property. Plain-
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tiff sued defendants for leaving the windows in her home in such 
an unfastened state the burglars were later able to gain easy 
access to the home. The issue presented was one of proximate cause: 
was the burglary a natural and probable consequence of the defen-
dant's negligence - assuming they were negligent - an issue the 
court did not ever have to decide. 
The Supreme Court held the defendant's negligence was too 
remote to constitute the proximate cause, when an independent, 
illegal, criminal act of a third person, which could not reason-
ably have been foreseen, and without which such injury would not 
have been sustained intervenes. Based upon this fact situation, 
the court said a person is not bound to anticipate malicious or 
criminal acts of others by which damage is inflicted. This is 
the part of the opinion the trial judge in the instant case used 
to instruct the jury. 
However, it appears obvious the instant case is factually 
different from Strong. In the instant case, there were a con-
siderable amount of prior shootings, knifings, fightings, etc., 
on the premises sufficient to justify an inference by the jury 
that the defendants knew or should have known that other fightings 
and shootings should be reasonably anticipated on the premises 
during the New Year's Eve Celebration, and have taken sufficient 
steps to prevent these "crimes." 
Had the trial judge read further in the Strong case, he 
would have found modifying language that should have been used 
in his Instruction No. 36 and which the plaintiff requested in 
his Instruction No. 26 [R. Ill] but which was refused. This 
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language is cited by the Utah Supreme Court on p. 302 of the Utah 
Reports as follows: 
"But where an independent illegal act is of a 
nature which might have been anticipated, and 
which it was the defendant's duty to provide 
against, he will be liable for breach of such 
duty notwithstanding the production of injuries 
by the intervention of an act of the character 
described." 
The language just cited is in accordance with the case of Industrie 
Park Businessmen's Club, Inc. v. Buck, supra, and the other cases 
cited in support of the general rules of law described in Buck. 
This language would have permitted the jury to decide the ultimate 
issue in this case instead of taking the case from them. 2 Restate 
ment Law of Torts 2d, §449 "Tortious or Criminal Acts, Probability 
of Which Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent;" §302B "Risk of Inten-
tional or Criminal Conduct," Subsection (e) p. 90; 57 Am. Jur.2d 
Negligence 583-586 §207 "Foreseeable Criminal Conduct," and §208 
"Concurrent Operation of Negligence and Intervening Criminal Act." . 
Terrell v. Key System, 69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 159 P.2d 704 (1945) 
which was an action to recover for injuries a passenger sustained 
during a fall from a train owned by the defendant Railroad Company. 
The passenger fell when struck or pushed by another passenger, dur-
ing a brawl participated in by other passengers following a "crap" 
game. The evidence showed previous experience of disorders arising 
from "crap" games; and the prior experience prevented the carrier 
from escaping liability on the theory that its negligence, if any, 
would not be the proximate cause of the injuries because they were 
the result of an intervening criminal act of a third party. See 
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also Wallace v. Per - Ohanin, 199 Cal. App. 2d 144, 18 Cal. 
Rptr 892 (1962), where a camp operator was held to be liable 
for injuries and damages sustained by a girl from an unknown 
assailant when she was a camp visitor and where the court found 
the risk for sexual moestation should have been foreseen and 
guarded against by the operator; even though there had been no 
prior incidents of a similar nature occurring at the camp. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel submitted to 
the court proposed instructions dealing with the general prin-
ciples of law set forth in Strong and Buck, but the trial judge 
refused these instructions. [R. 111]. By instructing the jury 
in accordance with Instruction No. 36, the jury was given 
only part of the general rule of law without the corresponding 
counterpart providing that if the crime is of a nature which 
might have been anticipated, and which it was the defendant's 
duty to provide against, the defendant would be liable for 
a breach of the duty notwithstanding the production of injuries 
by the intervention of an act of the character described. 
This other part was necessary to allow the jury to be the 
sole judges of the credibility of the evidence and to be 
the sole triers of fact. By taking the issues from the jury, 
the court in effect directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendant lodge and its officers against the plaintiff. Dur-
rant v. Pelton, supra. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS WILLIAM GATELY 
SINCE HIS TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF REASONABLE 
SECURITY MEASURES WHICH WERE NOT TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT BEEHIVE 
LODGE OF ELKS #407; AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE DID ADMIT TESTI-
MONY SOLICITED BY DEFENDANTS FROM OTHER WITNESSES BEARING UPON THIS 
ISSUE. 
The trial judge instructed the jury on the issues of ordin-
ary care [Instruction No. 10 (R. 169)] and negligence [Instruction 
No. 15 (R. 176)] but then refused plaintiff the opportunity to pro-
duce a witness who would have been most helpful to the jury in 
determining these two issues. In his instructions, the court statec 
the standard of conduct required in any given case "is dictated and 
measured by the immediate requirements of the occasion as determinec 
by existing facts and circumstances." [R. 176]. This was further 
emphasized to be "the exercise of reasonable diligence and such 
watchfulness, caution and foresight as under all of the circum-
stances of a particular case would be exercised by a reasonably, 
careful, prudent person." [R. 169]. i , 
In the instant case, the plaintiff alleges the defendants 
breached their duty of reasonable care, diligence, watchfulness, 
caution, and foresight in several regards, to-wit: 
1. When Anderson Pearson refused to get the special security 
training which Mr. James Dooley, the most exalted ruler of the 
Beehive Lodge of Elks, requested him to obtain less than one (1) 
month prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration and for the specific 
purpose of better performing his security duties at the said 
Celebration, in being able to handle shootings, knifings, etc. 
[R. 407-412]. 
2. When Exie Gray failed to investigate the Saturday night 
shooting to determine who did the shooting, etc. 
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3. When the Beehive Lodge of Elks failed to take proper/ 
necessary, and reasonable steps to insure that a recurrence of the 
Saturday night fight between Galveston Sonny Scott and the dece-
dent David Allen Gray did not happen during the New Year's Eve 
Celebration. In this regard, the lodge's officer Exie Gray was 
the acting manager of both the Saturday night dance and the New 
Year's Eve Celebration. [B. 383, 504-505]. He reported the fact 
of the Saturday night fight to James Dooley; [R. 400] and Anderson 
Pearson [R. 424]; yet none of these three did anything. 
4. By not having an adequate detection system set up at the 
front entryway to detect persons who came into the lodge carrying 
guns. It is clear the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott had a gun; 
and Shelly 0. Smith, the bandleader, said after the shooting, he 
observed many people moving toward the front door with guns in 
their belts. He mentioned eight (8) of these persons by name and 
said there were several others whose names he did not know. [R. 350]. 
5. By not exercising due diligence to become aware of the 
fight that took place when several of Mr. Scott's friends grabbed 
him and wrestled him to the ground for several minutes after he 
entered the premises. This occurred several minutes prior to the 
shooting. [R. 569-570]. Had the management exercised due diligence 
in this matter, they would have been able to determine, as Mr. 
Scott's friends did, that Scott had a gun and could have taken him 
outside at that point. 
6. By not having Anderson Pearson identify himself and 
disarm Galveston Sonny Scott and take him outside when Pearson was 
two feet (2') from him and he noticed Mr. Scott had a gun in his 
hand which had not yet been used. [R. 436-438]. 
7. By not having James Dooley identify himself and disarm 
Scott and send him outside when Dooley was only three feet (3') away 
from Scott and he noticed Scott had a gun in his hand behind his 
back which had not been used yet, and he watched Scott move toward 
the rear of the building and put a chair on top of a table and 
commence firing. [R. 445]. 
8. By not having sufficient security personnel on the prem-
ises during a New Year's Eve Celebration where a large amount of 
money was present at the entryway, where intoxicating beverages 
were served, and where other shootings and fights had occurred within 
a reasonable period of time so as to put the Beehive Lodge of Elks 
under the duty to take sufficient steps to insure the said fightings 
and/or shootings did not recur. 
9. In not having adequate security equipment on the person 
of Anderson Pearson and available for use by him during the New 
Year's Eve Celebration; such equipment consisting of a Kel-light 
2 1/2 pound flashlight, chemical mace which could have rendered 
Scott unconscious, and other measures. 
10. In not insuring that Anderson Pearson and/or other members 
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of the lodge's officers had sufficient unarmed combat training so 
as to be able to disable Mr. Scott by a blow to the shoulder 
when Anderson Pearson and James Dooley were only a few feet from 
him and before he had started shooting. 
The plaintiff alleges all of the foregoing statement of 
facts did bear on the issue of whether the defendants exercised 
reasonable care under the circumstances as they existed during the 
New Year's Eve Celebration. Since the lodge elected to use 
Anderson Pearson, an unpaid volunteer, rather than hired security 
personnel, it was incumbent upon the lodge to insure the security 
was adequate, even though the services were to be rendered gratui-
tously. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence, 424 §74 "Performance of Duty 
Voluntarily or Gratuitously Assumed." 2 Restatement Law of Torts 
2d, §323 "Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Pender Services," 
and §324A "Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of 
Undertaking." In order for the jury to exercise any reasonable 
judgment on this matter, it would have been helpful for them to 
know what security equipment was available in the Salt Lake County 
Community, what the cost of the security personnel and/or equip-
ment was, and then determine whether the lodge was reasonable in 
using or not using any of that security personnel and/or equipment. 
The need for testimony on these issues becomes even more 
clear when the defendants were permitted to solicit testimony from 
another member of the Antlered Guard [the lodge's internal security 
division] Sylvester Jones, who was on the premises that evening as 
a guest - not in his official capacity. Mr. Jones said there was 
nothing he could have done to disarm Scott and/or Binky Coleman 
when he saw them moving toward the rear of the building. [R. 473-
474]. He did admit however that had he been on duty, he would 
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have carried a night stick onto the premises. [R. 474]. The 
plaintiff should have been permitted to show what could have been 
done to stop the shooting, if Mr. Pearson had obtained certain 
security equipment readily available in Salt Lake County and/or if 
he had received the security training James Dooley sent him to get. 
It was in an effort to rebut the conclusions of Sylvester 
Jones stated above and in order to assist the jury to make an 
enlightened judgment upon the issue of negligence and ordinary care, 
that the plaintiff called as an expert witness one William Gately. 
[R. 611-639. Abstract pp. 27-35]. The defendants objected to any 
testimony from Mr. Gately; so the plaintiff made an offer of 
proof pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The offer of proof was specifically made in two (2) separate parts, 
to-wit: the first part dealing with what security personnel and 
equipment are available in the Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City 
community; and the second part dealing with a "security survey" 
which Mr. Gately had made. [R. 637]. It was specifically pointed 
out to the court the first part of the offer of proof did not go to 
Mr. Gately's expert opinion as to his security survey; but was 
testimony based on Mr. Gately's personal knowledge, observation and 
experience in the Salt Lake County community to the effect that 
certain security people are available, what training they have, and 
what equipment is available, such as chemical mace, night sticks, 
etc. [R. 637]. The court refused the offer of proof on either of 
these separate grounds; and further refused to accept Exhibit 14-P 
which was Mr. Gately's security survey consisting of his findings 
and conclusions on these two (2) separate parts of his testimony. 
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Mr. Gately stated he was the division manager for Wallace 
Detective and Security Agency and had been so employed since 1965. 
[R. 612]. He stated he was responsible for twelve (12) states and 
approximately six hundred (600) people working for this security 
agency. [R. 612]. He testified he had worked as a securivy office 
for private clubs checking I.D.'s, crowd control on the pre: ses 
and around the premises to keep fights and other problems av;:y. 
[R. 613] . He testified he had been engaged as a private clut mana-
ger for three (3) years in Portland, Oregon in a restaurant lounge 
that had live entertainment seven (7) nights a week. [R. 613]. He 
testified he was familiar with the security personnel and equip-
ment that are available in Salt Lake County. [R. 613]. In responsi 
to a question by the court, he stated there were private clubs in 
Salt Lake City that do avail themselves of the type of services his 
company provides. [R. 614]. He stated he provides fifty (50) 
security people for work in Salt Lake County. [R. 615]. 
Mr. Gately testified he was familiar with the type of equip-
ment available in the Salt Lake Community for use by security 
personnel and that it was used by Wallace Security. He identified 
the security equipment the guards would carry with them while they 
are performing security services as chemical mace and also a Kel-
light which is an eighteen inch (18") combination flashlight and nigh 
stick weighing approximately two and one-half pounds (2 1/2 lbs). 
[R. 616-617]. He said the chemical mace of the type normally used 
is CD-2. He said it comes in two (2) forms - either a cloud or a 
direct stream deflect of up to and including ten (10) feet. It 
works on the nerve and respiratory systems of the person shot with 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it. He says it is aimed and sprayed in the high chest or face area. 
It will completely disable a person for a period of approximately 
twenty-five to thirty (25-30) minutes by knoddng him out - rendering 
him unconscious. [R. 617]. He said there is no danger that the 
person sprayed would suffer some bodily injury or death by the 
mace because its effects wear off in twenty-five to thirty (25-30) 
minutes. [R. 617]. He said the chemical mace cost Seven Dollars 
and Ninety-Five Cents ($7.95) for a tube which would provide twenty 
to thirty (20-30) shots. He said the spray is used like an aerosol 
under arm deoderant spray. [R. 618]. He stated that security 
people would be trained in where to aim the spray, when to use it, 
and how to use it so that they don't render themselves ineffective 
at the same time. 
Mr. Gately testified trained security personnel would be 
trained in crowd control including unarmed combat as well as security 
awareness to recognize potential problems, etc. He testified he 
had been a head instructor on this training. He testified his 
security personnel receive training in disabling a person who like 
Scott might have a firearm in their hgnd or another dangerous weapon 
and was threatening somebody else with it. 
Mr. Gately testified the presence of men in uniform is a 
deterrent to anyone who is going to try to commit a crime and this 
would have stopped Scott at the entryway. [R. 633]. He said that 
if Mr. Scott had gotten through the entryway without being detected, 
he would have been removed from the premises as soon as the fracas 
started with his friends, because the other security officers , 
would have converged on the area and immediately disbursed the 
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people. [R. 633] . 
He testified if one of his security officers had been 
standing behind Mr. Scott such as Anderson Pearson was doing, he 
could have disarmed him by using self-defense, anti-combat type 
thing. He testified one judo blow to the shoulder of the gun hand 
would have disabled the entire arm. [R. 633]. He said chemical 
mace could have been used up to ten feet (10') away. When the coui 
asked him if this could be done even with other people in the im-
mediate area he said "Yes, your Honor. I mean you've got a man 
with a gun standing there. Those people would rather be maced 
than shot." To which the court agreed. [R. 634]. He stated if 
Scott had been coming off the dance floor and raising his gun to 
start to shoot, a security officer could have used his club-like 
flashlight to disable the arm and could have used the chemical mace 
from ten feet (101) away. He said it was definitely wrong for a 
security officer to run away and get down under the table because 
security people are trained to react on instinct to situations like 
that. He stated emphatically that with reasonable security measure 
in effect, the shooting never would have occurred. [R. 636] . 
Mr. Gately then testified about a security survey he had 
made for the Beehive Lodge of Elks premises to determine "what 
security measures would be reasonable for this location." [R. 620] 
He stated he had been present in court during the first three (3) 
days of testimony, that he reviewed the criminal trial transcript 
of Galveston Sonny Scott, the answers to interrogatories filed by 
the Beehive Lodge of Elks in the above entitled matter [R. 629]; 
that he went to the Salt Lake City Police Department to get the 
nc 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nnual report dealing with crime densities in Salt Lake City. 
R. 621-622]; and that he used certain manuals and other publica-
:ions in the industry which outline basic procedures and different 
:ypes and needs in the field of security. [R. 621-622]. * 
Based on these factors together with approximately forty (40) 
security surveys he had made for private clubs similar to the 
3eehive Lodge of Elks. [R. 623], he determined in his opinion 
bhere was no security or any security measures in effect at the 
Beehive Lodge of Elks premises to protect patrons and guests that 
night be on the premises during the New Year's Eve Celebration. 
[R. 629]. His findings, and conclusions were set forth in his 
security survey which was marked as Exhibit 14-P; which the court 
refused to admit. [R. 630,638]. 
The plaintiff submits Mr. Gately's opinion testimony dealing 
with the security survey would have been helpful to the jury in 
determining the issue of negligence and ordinary care and it was 
not inadmissible because it related to the ultimate fact in 
issue to be decided by the jury. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 56. 
Based on the security survey, Mr. Gately stated in his opin-
ion adequate security would call for five (5) security officers 
consisting of four (4) officers and one (1) post supervisor. [R. 626]. 
He testified where these men would be stationed. [R. 626-627]. 
He testified the cost of these five (5) security people for a six 
(6) hour period from 9:00 p.m. on New Year's Eve until 3:00"a.m. on 
New Year's morning would total Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy 
Center ($83.70) which would be Two Dollars and Seventy Cents ($2.70) 
per hour for the four (4) guard officers and Three Dollars and 
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Fifteen Cents ($3.15) per hour for the post supervisor. [R. 627-
628] . • 
The plaintiff submits this testimony from Mr. Gately was 
competent and would have been very helpful to the jury in determin-
ing such security oriented questions as (1) should Mr. Pearson hav< 
been wearing some type of security uniform; (2) should Mr. Pearson 
have had a Kel-light flashlight, chemical mace, or other equipment 
which could have been used to completely disable Mr. Galveston 
Sonny Scott and render him unconscious; (3) did Mr. Pearson have 
adequate unarmed combat type training to allow him to totally disal 
Scott's right arm which would have permitted him from being able 
to use his gun, and was Pearson negligent for notJgetting this 
training when Dooley asked him to less than one (1) month prior to 
the Celebration; (4) whether Anderson Pearson and/or Jim Dooley wei 
sufficiently trained in crowd control, unarmed combat, and use of 
security oriented equipment to have prevented the shooting which 
killed the minor decedent David Allen Gray; (5) should the men at 
the front entryway have stopped Scott when he entered the premises; 
(6) should Pearson, Dooley and the other officer have detected the 
fight between Scott and his friends after Scott entered the premise 
and should they have taken Scott outside. 
Since the jury was not experienced in security matters and 
since a lay person would not know about available training in unarm 
combat, use of Kel-light flashlights, chemical mace and other equip 
ment available, nor about costs for security personnel and equipmen 
Mr. Gately's testimony would have been admissible to assist the 
jury on these issues. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc., 20 U.2d 
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431, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). 
The plaintiff submits all of this testimony would be relevant 
to the issue of whether the Beehive Lodge of Elks acted with 
ordinary care or were negligent in providing security measures for 
the New Year's Eve Celebration. By refusing to allow the testimony, 
the plaintiff submits the trial judge committed prejudicial error, 
and deprived plaintiff of his right to a jury trial by withholding 
from the jury competent evidence relevant to the issues raised by 
the plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS' WITNESS SALT LAKE POLICE OFFICER JAMES 
BURNS BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY WAS NOT INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS FOR ANY 
RELEVANT OR LEGITIMATE PURPOSE, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO 
TESTIFY AND BECAUSE THE COURT HAD REFUSED TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY 
OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS WILLIAM GATELY BEARING ON THE SAME ISSUES 
THAT DETECTIVE BURNS TEST IFIED TO. 
The defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks called as its last witness 
James Burns, a police officer for the Salt Lake City Corporation 
working as a detective in the vice squad. [R. 934-941. Abstract pp. 
47-48]. After refusing to permit William Gately to testify and 
over numerous objections from plaintiff's counsel, the court allowed 
Mr. Burns to testify that he was not "aware of a private club having 
a security agency provided for security." The court allowed this 
testimony even though Mr. Burns admitted on voir dire examination 
he had not had any occasion to check with private clubs personally, 
nor to ask the management in the clubs what security measures they 
had taken for various security functions. [R. 936]. He further 
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admitted he had not made any studies of a particular club to de-
termine if they had security or not. [R. 936-937]. However, evei 
with this lack of foundation, the court permitted him to testify. 
.# _ , Mr. Burns was not presented as an expert witness [R. 937-93J 
and the court refused to admit his testimony for the purpose of 
showing custom or practice. [R. 938]. However, he was allowed tc 
answer the following question: "Would you tell us, officer, what 
you have observed from your own experience in regard to these pri\; 
clubs and lodges?" Mr. Burns then stated: "I have never been awa 
of a private club having a security agency provided for security 
at a private club." 
It is clear Mr. Burns' answer was in the first place not 
responsive to the question asked. He was asked what he had observ 
in regard to private clubs and lodges. His answer said that he wa 
not aware of a private club having any security agency provided. 
This answer was a conclusion and went far beyond his competency. 
To be responsive, his answer should have merely stated what he ob-
served - whether in fact he saw any security people in uniforms, 
carrying security equipment, etc. 
Furthermore, it is obvious there is no foundation as to whet 
he knew anything about security agencies. He admitted in voir dir 
examination that he had never checked with the private clubs perso 
ally to ask the management in each club as to what security measun 
they had taken for security functions. [R. 936]. He did not say 
he had checked with any security agencies to see if personnel had 
been furnished to private clubs. Without this foundation, his ansi 
would be inadmissible. 
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and usage and a proper foundation had been shown, the plaintiff 
still submits the testimony was prejudicial and should not have 
been allowed because the court had refused to allow plaintiff's 
witness, William Gately to testify about security personnel, equip-
ment, etc.; although Mr. Gately testified there were private clubs in 
Salt Lake City that used security personnel from Wallace Security. 
[R. 614]. It is generally held that if the introduction in a neg-
ligence situation of evidence as to precautions taken by others to 
avoid the infliction of injury under the same or similar conditions 
would result in a confusion of issues or inject many new controvers-
ial points collateral to the issues, or if it would tend to generate 
surprise and undue prejudice disproportionate to the usefulness of 
the evidence it should not be admitted. Brigham Young University v. 
Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 336 (1941) and 137 ALR 611 "Admissibility, 
Upon Issue of Negligence, of Evidence of Custom or Practice of Others." 
In Lillywhite, the trial court used a cautionary instruction 
to the jury which was not done by the court in the instant case. 
The plaintiff submits Mr. Burns' testimony led to a confusion of the 
issues and also to an introduction of new controversial parts colla-
teral to the main issue. Since Mr. Gately had been denied the 
opportunity to testify, there was no evidence presented by the plain-
tiff bearing on security agencies or their use by private clubs. 
Any such evidence would therefore be collateral to the main issues 
and was prejudicial. 
Counsel for the plaintiff raised at least six (6) specific 
objections to Mr. Burns' testimony from the time the first question 
was asked: [R. 935-938]. 
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1. "Your Honor, we will object to this type of 
questioning on the same grounds that we were not allowed 
to ask Mr. Gately these questions." [R. 935]. 
2. "Your Honor, I will object to this question. 
I would like to voir dire this witness as to his 
background." [R. 936]. 
;v , 3. "I think he said he has not made any study 
as to whether security people were there or not." -
Lack of Foundation Objection. [R. 937]. 
4. "Your Honor, we will object to his testimony. 
It is totally irrelevant and it is prejudicial, 
because the jury has to decide the security here." 
[R. 937]. 
5. "Your Honor, we will object on the other 
ground that it is not related to this New Year's Eve 
function or the Beehive Lodge of Elks, and that is 
the only question here. What has been done in other ,
 ; 
cases and other occasions is not admissible. It is 
not relevant. I mean if this is opened up, I think 
I have the opportunity to get into this whole area 
we talked about yesterday." - Meaning the testimony 
of Mr. William Gately that the court refused to admit 
the previous day. [R. 937]. 
6. "Your Honor, we think that invades the 
providence of the jury. That is really their question 
in this case." [R. 938]. 
After all of these objections were overruled, and the court 
allowed the testimony, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to 
rehabilitate the affect of Mr. Burns' testimony, and to determine 
what background he had in security, or how he knew whether security 
agencies were used by the private clubs. Plaintiff's counsel asked 
the following questions: - . ^, ;; 
"Q You are not a security expert, are you? 
A I am not a security guard. No, sir. 
Q Have you ever been a security guard? v« 
A' Yes, I have. '^  
Q Have you ever taken any courses in security? *;-?' 
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A I don't know what you mean by courses, at the University? 
Q Have you had any special training in security? 
--;.•;;.. A Yes, sir, almost everything I had deals with security. 
Q Alright. Are you aware of the type of equipment the 
people carry when they are performing security functions? 
MR. RUSSON: Your Honor, I am going to object. As I 
indicated before, I am not holding this witness out as an expert. 
THE COURT: You are now beyond the scope of cross-examination. 
The objection is sustained." [R. 940-941]. 
It is obvious the court not only allowed damaging and pre-
judicial testimony that was not relevant; but the court also 
refused to allow counsel for the plaintiff to deal effectively in 
cross-examination with the matter brought up by Mr. Burns. If 
Mr. Burns was permitted to testify that he had "never been aware of 
a private club having a security agency provided for security in 
private clubs," it would certainly appear to be proper on cross-
examination to delve into security agencies, types of security 
guards, equipment and uniforms used, etc. If Mr. Burns wasn't famil-
iar with the equipment used by security personnel, he may not have 
recognized the security men, even if they were present in the clubs. 
Since counsel for the defendants admitted Mr. Burns was not 
being produced as an expert witness, and since the court did not 
allow his testimony to come in to show "custom, usage, or practice" 
within the trade, there would be no basis for admitting the testi-
mony. By allowing it to be introduced, especially without caution-
ary remarks or instructions, the jury might have believed they were 
bound by the testimony to find that since no security agencies were 
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used in other private clubs, none should have been used by the 
Beehive Lodge of Elks. Since William Gately had been denied the 
right to testify on these matters, it was clearly prejudicial to 
allow James Burns to so testify. 
POINT IV . •• • - • V , 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS WHICH WERE REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS. 
Before the court questioned the panel of prospective jurors 
at the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff submitted to the court 
the "PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED QUESTIONS FOR VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS." [R. 216-218]. The court refused to give 
questions nos. 9, 14, and 15 and indicated his refusal by marking 
"NO" in the lefthand margin of the said request. The plaintiff sub-
mits that by refusing to ask the questions nos. 9, 14, and 15, the 
trial judge denied the plaintiff a jury trial in that plaintiff was 
not allowed to determine the prejudices, feelings, background, and 
experience of the jury in connection with certain matters, and there 
fore could not properly use his challenges for cause nor his pre-
emptory challenges. 
Question no. 9 [R. 217] reads as follows: "Do any of you, 
members of your immediate family, or close relatives now or have any 
of you in the past had the duty of processing or receiving claims 
for the company for which you worked or do now work?" The plaintiff 
submits if the prospective jurors had in fact worked in businesses 
which involved their processing or receiving claims, that they may 
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have developed a certain callousness, philosophy, or pre-
judice toward those who file claims against other parties, and 
may have harbored some resentment against the plaintiff in 
the instant action for filing his claim against the defendants. 
Had any of the jurors answered in the affirmative to this 
question, plaintiff's counsel could have pursued this matter 
to determine any bias or prejudice. 
The plaintiff bases his appeal on these grounds upon 
the cases of Keirnan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (1965) and 
Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091 (1975). 
Questions numbers 14 and 15 requested by the plaintiff 
also went to the question of whether any women on the jury 
would have children at home that would require them to be 
there at a particular time and whether any of the members of 
the jury would have appointments or schedules that required 
their presence some place else so they would be inconvenienced 
in the event the jury should be delayed in their deliberations 
until some late or unusually late hour in the evening or night 
because the trial may take several days. Again, the plaintiff was 
entitled to find out whether the jurors would have been able 
to give their full and complete attention to this case or 
whether they would have other commitments or responsibilities 
that would be on their minds to make it impossible for them 
to fairly evaluate the evidence. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, AND 36, AND BY REFUSING 
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 14, 15, 23, 
AND 26. 
The specific instructions which the plaintiff objects to 
with the page number of the record where they may he found are as 
follows: No. 18 [R. 180]; No. 32 [R. 194]; No. 33 [R. 195]; No. 34 
[R. 196]; No. 34 [R. 197]; and No. 36 [R. 198]. The plaintiff made 
timely objections to the court giving the foregoing instructions. 
[R. 950-953], and set forth the reasons for the objections which 
reasons are by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof 
at this time. 
Plaintiff also objected to the trial judge's refusal to give 
Plaintiffs Requested Instructions Nos. 14 [R. 99]; 15 [R. 100]; 
23 [R. 108]; and 26 [R. 111]. Proper exceptions were taken to the 
failure of the court to give these proposed instructions. [R. 950] 
Plaintiff's proposed Instruction No. 14 [R. 99] was a necessa 
part of the instruction on negligence to appraise the jury of the 
fact that "the greater the danger which is known or is reasonably 
to be anticipated, the greater is the degree of care which is re-
quired to be observed." In the instant case, it is clear if the ju 
had found the Beehive Lodge of Elks and/or its officers should have 
anticipated fightings and/or shootings might occur during the New 
Year's Eve Celebration, this would have imposed on them a greater 
degree of care than if they had not so found. 2 Harper & James Tort 
(1956) §16.9 p. 931. 
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Instruction No. 15 [P. 100] was based on the general law 
found in 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence, pp. 411-412 §59 "Anticipation 
of Some Harm Is Sufficient." Otherwise, the jury might have felt 
the lodge was not negligent unless it could have anticipated the 
exact shooting which occurred involving Scott and Gray. 
Plaintiffs proposed Instruction No. 23 [R. 108], dealt with 
the status of Anderson Pearson and other volunteer members of the 
Elks Club who provided the security during the New Year's Eve 
Celebration. The testimony by the lodge witnesses revealed there 
were no hired security personnel on the premises; and any security 
was provided by volunteer members of the lodge. The inference 
would be that the volunteers were held to a lower standard of care 
than if hired security guards had been employed. Plaintiff's pro-
posed Instruction No. 23 [R. 108] was an instruction to the jury that 
even though Anderson Pearson may have been an unpaid volunteer mem-
ber of the club while providing security, the law imposes an obliga-
tion upon everyone who attempts to do something for another even 
gratuitously to exercise ordinary care and skill in the performance 
of what he has undertaken. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 424 §74 
"Performance of Duty Voluntarily and Gratuitously Undertaken." 
Without this instruction, the jury may have felt Anderson Pearson 
would have been held to a lower standard of care in providing 
security than a hired security guard would be. > 
Plaintiff's proposed Instruction No. 26 [R. Ill] was dis-
cussed under POINT I, above. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff submits the 
cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors committed by the 
trial judge, effectively denied the plaintiff his right to a jury 
trial as guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and 
the State of Utah; and this case should be remanded for a new tria 
on all of the issues raised against the defendants Beehive Lodge 
of Elks #407, and its officers, trustees and agents. In the 
event a new trial is ordered, the plaintiff also requests this 
court to decide all of issues raised on appeal as an aid to the 
parties and the trial judge. .*. ; -.. ,, 
-
 ;i, RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES 
By \ \ J, 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
: •• , ,525 South 300 East 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
I certify that I delivered two (2) copies of Appellant's 
Brief to Leonard H. Russon Attorney for Defendant, Beehive Lodge o 
Elks and its officers, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and to Ron Eubanks, Attorney for Defendant, Galveston Sonny Scott, 
250 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of April 
1976. • ''•''. *."f ' , ••••••:•• *-:*.• :• •":•." -
Clfyyr^ 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES 
t625 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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